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THE NATIONAL AIR LINES STRIKE:
A CASE STUDY
By MARK L. KAHN-
Assistant Professor of Economics, Wayne University; Associate
Director of Case Analysis, Wage Stabilization Board, Region VI-B
(Michigan); Columbia University, B.A., 1942; Harvard University,
Ph.D., 1950.
N ATIONAL Airlines, a medium-size carrier with about 1,650
employees, was beset by labor troubles during the early post-
war-years. These erupted, early in 1948, into two protracted strikes.
The International Association of Machinists (IAM) called out Na-
tional's 675 clerical and office workers on January 23, and the 650
maintenance employees, also represented by the IAM, "respected" the
clerical picket lines. This strike lasted for six months. On February
3, over an unrelated issue, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
initiated a walkout of National's 125 pilots. This strike continued
for almost nine months, and complications developing out of the pilot
dispute had not been resolved until 1950. All airline work stoppages
prior to the National strikes had been less than four weeks in duration.
The length of the disputes, and the determination with which they
were fought on both sides, found the parties resorting to a variety of
tactics unparalleled in airline experience. For the first time, a carrier
tried to break a strike by the hiring of replacements. Assorted legal
actions were instituted. Public relations activities aimed particularly
as National's customers were given considerable emphasis. Unusual
political pressures were applied. The recommendations of a Presiden-
tial Emergency Board, belatedly appointed in May, 1948, were rejected
by the company. The Civil Aeronautics Board, which has always tried
to steer clear of union-management disputes, became deeply embroiled.
For these and other reasons, the National experience has provided a
particularly revealing episode in the development of airline industrial
relations. The -purpose of this article is to recount and to extract
the relevant lessons from the National Airlines controversy.
BACKGROUND: THE IAM STRIKE
On December 13, 1945, the National Mediation Board certified
the IAM as the representative of the mechanical, ground service and
stores employees of National Airlines.x Prior to this date, as later re-
ported by a Presidential Emergency Board, National's management
... had attempted to prevent the employees from affiliating with a
national union and to bring about the establishment of an independ-
* For another discussion of the Railway Labor Act applied to airlines see
comment by Frankel, "Airline Labor Policy, the Stepchild of the Railway Labor
Act," 18 J. AIR LAW & COM. 461.
1 NMB Case'No. R-1548.
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ent [company] organization of its employees. Its efforts in this
direction included the offer of the free use of the Carrier's legal
services in securing certification of an independent union and in
the preparation of a contract with the Carrier; they included also
the promise of more substantial future benefits to the employees
from the formation of an independent union than would be forth-
coming if they affiliated with a national union.2
In spite of these efforts, the results of the NMB representation election
constituted an overwhelming endorsement of the IAM.8 Although
a first contract was signed on March 17, 1946, and a second contract on
January 17, 1947, this entire period was marked by frequent manifes-
tations of hostility toward the union on the part of National and of a
lack of good faith on the part of the carrier in living up to the terms
of the contracts it did sign.
During the summer of 1946, the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks,
commenced an organizing campaign among the clerical and office per-
sonnel of National. The IAM had no desire to represent this bargain-
ing unit, but it contested the BRC's asserted claim to stores employees.
On January 31, 1947, the NMB included stores personnel within the
clerical craft or class.4 To maintain its representation rights for the
stores employees, the IAM promptly undertook, in competition with
the BRC, to represent the enlarged clerical unit. After winning a
close election, the IAM was certified as representative of the clerical
unit on April 1, 1947.5
Early in June, the !AM local chairman requested from National
a copy of the wage rates, job descriptions and titles used by the carrier
for its employees in the clerical unit, these data to be used by the
IAM in formulating the union's proposals for a clerical contract. This
request was repeated several times during the next two months, but
the material was not supplied. In August, the IAM finally constructed
a proposed contract without the benefit of this information, and trans-
mitted the document to National on August 27. After some delay
and a postponement, both due to the Company, negotiations com-
menced on October 21.
Unproductive bargaining sessions continued for eight days. Con-
siderable ,time was spent listening to National's President Baker tell
the union leaders why there should not be a union. Apparent througl-
out was National's ,unwillingness to limit or compromise what it re-
garded as essential managerial prerogatives. The company's contract
proposal concerning seniority, for example, read: "Seniority, while it
shall not be considered a controlling factor in promotions, demotions,
2 Emergency Board (No. 62), appointed May 15, 1948, pursuant to Section
10 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended (hereafter cited as: NAL Emergency
Board), Report to the President, p. 11.
8 Out of 315 workers eligible to vote, 270 cast valid ballots. 264 of these
designated the IAM.
4 NMB Case No. R-1706, et al. "Determination of Craft or Class."
5 NMB Case No. R-1706. "Certification." 640 out of 849 eligible employees
cast ballots. The vote: 285 for IAM; 259 for BRC; and 96 void.
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transfers and layoffs, will be considered." To govern the compensa-
tion of employees assigned to temporary service away from their home
stations, National's proposal read: "The Company, at its option, may
establish a per diem to cover all expenses other than transportation.,
On October 29, after documenting its case with a detailed statement
of National's financial position, the Company insisted that no wage
increase was possible at that time. It then insisted on a recess, over
the union's objection, until December 2. On November 17, without
prior notice, National unilaterally instituted a wage increase of $20
per month, for all employees earning less than $275 per month and
not covered by labor agreements. "This wage increase was applicable
to the clerical employees represented by the Association whose nego-
tiating representatives had just been informed that no increase in
wages was possible."7
The IAM had requested NMB intervention on October,31. On
November 12 (five days before the unilateral wage increase) the cleri-
cal employees took a strike vote and set a strike date for December 12,
so notifying the Company and the NMB. A mediator arrived on the
scene on December 1, and fresh negotiations began on the following
day in his presence. The IAM agreed to postpone the'strike. This.
time, the Company adopted the apparently dilatory tactic of insisting
upon an unlimited right to contract out all work, while it refused to-
discuss other contract terms until the contracting-out issue was settled.
These negotiations continued through December 8, on which date the
mediator informed the parties of his belief that a stalemate had been
reached. On December 10, the mediator made a formal proffer of
arbitration in writing, which the IAM accepted the following day.
The Company, replying on December 17, stated its unwillingness to
arbitrate at that time, but informed the NMB that it wotild submit the
question to its Board of Directors at a January meeting. On Decem-
ber 23, National announced to its employees changed Company poli-
cies with respect to sick leave, vacations, holidays, notice of layoffs and
grievances - matters which it had refused to discuss during the pre-
ceding series of negotiations with the IAM.
Although the NMB had made a formal proffer of arbitration, its
mediator nevertheless returned to Miami on January 13, 1948, in an
attempt to effect a resumption of negotiations. He could not persuade
National's management to attend, however, and he so informed the
union on January 19. On January 21, in a letter which noted that
National's Board of Director had not accepted arbitration in a meet-
ing on January 20, the mediator informed the parties that the services
of the NMB had been terminated. On January 22, the IAM clerical
group met and reset the strike date for noon on January 23.
While the foregoing events were taking place, National's mainte-
nance personnel had also been encountering difficulties. The union
6 NAL Emergency Board, transcript, pp. 815, 934.
7 NAL Emergency Board, Report, p. 12.
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had many serious grievances concerning the administration of its
January, 1947, collective agreement.8 Matters reached a climax in
,August, when, without prior consultation, the Company proceeded to
dismiss the employees of its Instrument Department and to contract
out the work they had previously performed. Unable to make head-
way in subsequent negotiations, and aware that the deadline for a new
contract was approaching, the IAM requested N MB mediation for
the maintenance group in November, 1947. 9 The Board, already well
occupied with National and the IAM clerical union, failed to respond
promptly to this request.
On January 22, recognizing that a walkout at National was immi-
nent, the NMB seized upon the November request as a possible basis
for effective intervention. It notified IAM President Harvey Brown,
in Washington, that the Board members themselves would mediate
the maintenance dispute on January 26, and that they would like to
mediate the clerical dispute at the same time. Ten minutes before
the strike deadline the following day, a wire from President Brown
reached the IAM local leadership in Miami stating the NMB's request
that strike action be deferred until this new effort at mediation had
been made. Before the widespread clerical groups could be contacted,
however, their strike had already begun.
The union leadership, assisted by the federal mediator (who had
been reassigned to the case), persuaded some strikers to return to
their jobs. Other groups refused, however, because they feared Com-
pany discipline or discharge. When this became generally known,
other stations ceased work again. The following day, January 24, a ten-
tative "no discrimination" agreement was made between IAM and the
Company, but this was rejected at an employees' meeting on January
25 because it "did not provide for a means of settling the disputes."'10
On Monday, January 26, the IAM appeared at the NMB offices as
requested, but the Company did not. National took the position that
it would not mediate while a strike was in process.
National's maintenance employees, while not legally entitled to
strike under the Railway Labor Act, refused to cross the clerical picket
lines and were therefore on strike as well. There is, indeed, evidence
to suggest that the maintenance workers were more solidly on strike
8 The subjects in dispute included: establishment of "lead mechanic" classi-
fications; wage adjustments under the provisions of the agreement; hours;
vacations; holidays with pay; limitations on committee activities in connection
with grievances; denial of the IAM chairman's pass privileges; and the formula-
tion of an apprenticeship agreement.
9 NMB Case No. A-2732. An IAM official later testified that President Baker
had made the remarkable assertion "that it was his [Baker's] ambition to oper-
ate an airline in which all he had to do was to exchange money and where he
had no responsibilities to the employees and no unions." This testimony was not
contradicted. NAL Emergency Board, Transcript, p. 782.
10 NAL President Baker asserted on January 26 that only 140 persons
attended the union meeting called to ratify the agreement, and that only 37 of
these were clerical employees. Letter to National Employees (mimeographed).
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than the clerical workers." The Company maintained operations
despite the walkout and promptly set about hiring replacements for
the strikers on a "permanent" basis.
BACKGROUND: THE ALPA STRIKE
On September 13, 1945, a National Airlines first pilot named
Maston G. O'Neal, Jr., was involved in a major accident.' 2 He was
promptly suspended, pending a hearing which took place the follow-
ing day. Two weeks after the accident, Captain O'Neal was discharged.
The ALPA processed a grievance protesting this discharge through
the System Board of Adjustment, composed of two Company and two
ALPA representatives.' 3 The System Board was unable to render a
decision concerning the propriety of O'Neal's dismissal, the votes be-
ing evenly split. It was equally unable to agree upon a method for
breaking the deadlock. On May 6, 1946, under the terms of the
National-ALPA agreement then in effect, the System Board lost juris-
diction of the case. 14
The ALPA, in the person of President Behncke, continued to press
for a solution to the dispute, principally through correspondence and
conferences with National's President Baker. On March 31, 1947,
having made no progress in the interim, Mr. Behncke wrote as follows
to Chairman Douglass of the National Mediation Board:
I presume that the only way we will be able to get this matter
settled is to threaten a strike and force the appointment of a neu-
tral by the National Mediation Board to make a determination.
Unless I hear from Mr. Baker, I presume that the pilots will insist
that this action be taken about the fifteenth [of April]. Your
cooperation will be greatly appreciated to get this matter settled. 15
Additional correspondence and telegrams disclosed the continued re-
luctance of Mr. Baker to submit the merits of O'Neal's discharge to
the judgment of an impartial arbitrator. On May 13, the ALPA served
a strike notice on the Company. A meeting in the offices of the NMB
took place the next day. Under the pressure of an imminent pilot
11 NAL's Industrial Relations Director later testified that he believed only
17 percent of the clerical force struck, while 83 percent of the maintenance work-
ers refused to cross the picket lines. Ibid., p. 1036.
120'Neal landed his plane at excessive speed in a tail-high attitude too far
down a wet runway. A sea-wall prevented the plane from skidding into the
ocean. No one aboard was injured, but the collision destroyed the aircraft. The
Company subsequently decided that O'Neal lacked the judgment required of a
pilot and discharged him in the interest of safety. The merits of the case involve
highly technical judgments and are not particularly germane to this study. They
are thoroughly discussed in the "Opinion of Neutral Referee and Award," Na-
tional Airlines Pilots System Board of Adjustment, Aug. 6, 1949 (mimeographed).
13 The establishment of bi-partite System Boards of Adjustment is required
by the Railway Labor Act, as amended, Section 204.
14 ,. . . If agreement upon a procedure [for breaking a deadlock] is not
reached within thirty (30) days and such thirty (30) days is not further ex-
tended by consent of the parties hereto, the Board shall have no further jurisdic-
tion in--that.case." National-ALPA System Board of Adjustment Agreement,
Dec. 9, 1941, Sec. (m).
15 NAL Emergency Board, Transcript, p. 78.
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walkout the Company and the ALPA signed an agreement requesting
the NMB to appoint a fifth, or neutral, member of the System Board
of Adjustment, with the understanding that the decision of the System
Board so constituted would be final and binding in the O'Neal case.
This step might well have led to the termination of the controversy,
had not the NMB designated an individual to whom the ALPA took
strong exception.
The fifth System Board member named by the NMB was Mr. Oscar
Bakke, an employee of the Safety Bureau of the Civil Aeronautics
Board. The parties were notified concerning his selection on May 22.
On June 3, 1947, Mr. Behncke lodged a vehement protest in a letter
to the Secretary of the NMB:
There is no time when there isn't a sharp disagreement between
this politically controlled Safety Bureau and the air line pilots....
The, Safety Bureau of the CAB is a misfit and a miscarriage of the
true purpose intended .... We are completely and unalterably con-
vinced . . . that Mr. Oscar Bakke, or anyone else from the Safety
Bureau of the Civil Aeronautics Board, because of his position and
the reasons stated herein and loyalty to his superiors would be
unable to act without prejudice. .16
When the NMB informed Mr. Bakke concerning Mr. Behncke's objec-
tions, Mr. Bakke readily appreciated the situation and withdrew his
acceptance of the appointment. On June 17, the NMB notified the
parties that "due to unforeseen circumstances" Mr. Bakke had resigned,
and that Mr. Floyd McGown, of San Antonio, had been named as the
fifth System Board member. On June 28, National's attorney wrote
to the NMB:
... I have learned to my utter amazement that the unforeseen
circumstances which caused Mr. Bakke' to resign . . . was due to
. . . objection to his appointment registered by Mr. David L.
Behncke. . . . For Mr. Behncke to cause the resignation of the
referee so appointed naturally leads to our belief that Mr. Behncke
will not accept any appointees of the Mediation Board unless and
until the appointee is satisfactory to him. . . . I am directed to
withdraw the request of National Airlines, Inc., for the appoint-
ment of a referee unless the original appointee is permitted to
serve.17
Another stalemate ensued. In late October another pilot strike date
.was set for November 12 and then postponed one week at NMB
request. From November 17 through 19 National and the ALPA met
again under NMB auspices, but had reached no agreement when Mr.
Behncke departed for an ALPA Executive Board meeting in Chicago.
The ALPA President had indicated that the pilots would not quit
their jobs.
There were no further negotiations between National and the
ALPA. On February 3 at 9:00 A.M.,' Mr. Baker received a wire in-
16 Ibid., pp. 97-100.
17 Ibid., pp. 106-109.
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forming him that his pilots would strike at 11:00 A.M., which they did.
This was eleven days after the start of the IAM strike. The NMB
promptly requested the parties to meet in Washington on February 7.
On February 4, National's attorney offered to accept one neutral to
be appointed by the NMB to settle the O'Neal case. The NMB so
notified Mr. Behncke, who agreed to accept the offer at the February 7
meeting. However,
At the scheduled meeting, . . . [National's attorney] stated that
Carrier's offer had been withdrawn the day before and his only
authority was to listen to proposals of the Association. He then
advised the Chairman of the Mediation Board of the action of the
* Carrier in discharging all pilots two days before. Upon receipt of
that information by the Mediation Board, further efforts to com-
pose the differences were discontinued.' 8
The ALPA had hoped that the prompt appointment of a Presidential
Emergency Board would occur, and thus terminate the strike. But,
in the words of NMB Chairman Douglass:
The President was not advised of the pendency of this strike be-
cause the Board felt this strike did not substantially interrupt
interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of
the country of essential transportation service and also because
we were convinced that management would more than likely not
participate in any hearings to ascertain the facts and, in no event,
would abide by any recommendations of a fact-finding board.19
The occurrence of the IAM strike had undoubtedly influenced the
timing of the pilot walkout. There was some concern over the state
of aircraft maintenance under strike conditions after January 23, and
it was believed that National would offer less "resistance in the face of
a doubie strike. The ALPA also felt the time to interrupt traffic, for
maximum effect, was at the beginning of the peak months of Febru-
ary, March and April. But in no sense was the ALPA's action a sym-
pathy strike.
National had maintained a high level of operations following the
IAM strike, but the pilot walkout forced the cancellation of all flights.
When the Company discharged the ALPA pilots on February 5, it
simultaneously advertised for qualified replacements. 20 CAA sources
indicated that there were about 1,100 pilots with airline transport rat-
ings not then employed by scheduled carriers. National's first trip
with non-union pilots took place on February 11. Schedules were
enlarged in subsequent weeks as more pilots were checked out for duty
on National's routes. To guard against accidents, the CAA on Feb-
ruary 16 tightened a number of operating requirements "until the
pilots get the requisite experience." No aircraft accidents did occur
on National throughout the ten-month pilot strike.
18 NAT Emergency Board, Report, pp. 6-7.
19 Letter to Senator Pat McCarran, Mar. 4, 1946 (mimeographed copy by
National Airlines).
20New York Times, Feb. 7, 1948.
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THE PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY BOARD
As National continued to, increase operations through March, April
and May, the breach between the Company and the two striking unions
widened. Injunction proceedings were instituted by both the unions
and the Company.21 National sued each union for $5,000,000 in
actions that commenced February 5, charging libel and slander in
connection with allegations that National's aircraft were unsafe. 22 In
April, the ALPA sued National for $1,000,000 to offset financial losses
allegedly caused by the Company's actions, which had "caused the
strike, and prevented its settlement.23 Principal National airports were
picketed by both IAM and ALPA members, while the ALPA instituted
aerial picketing with towed signs and smokewriting to discourage pas-
senger traffic. Table A provides data to illustrate the impact of the
strike on National's operations. Because of the marked seasonal varia-
tion present in National's traffic, 1947 statistics are provided as a
rough basis of comparison. A substantial recovery in traffic had been
achieved by the close of April, 1948, although, particularly in domes-
tic service, passenger-miles and load factors remained well below the
comparable 1947 figures. The low daily aircraft utilization, as com-
pared to the preceding year, reveals the continued impact of the strike
situation.
There appeared to be no immediate prospect of a settlement ac-
ceptable to the unions, however, except as a consequence of affirmative
federal intervention. Only an Emergency Board was in order, but the
NMB had declined to recommend one.
Mr. Behncke's plan was disclosed in an "Inter-Association Letter
to all ALPA Members' on March 23, 1948. He wrote:
• ..The [National Mediation] Board takes the position in its
letter to Senator Pat McCarran that the flight stoppage on National
doesn't constitute a flight stoppage of sufficient magnitude to war-
rant the appointment of an Emergency Board. A larger emer-
gency is obviously necessary.24
Three days later, the ALPA Board of Directors passed the following
resolution:
It may become necessary for the members of the Air Line Pilots
Association to honor and respect their own picket lines, those of
the National Airlines pilots where they are established at the prin-
cipal terminal points of the Company, by notifying all airline corn-
panics flying into areas where such picket lines exist that it is the
intention of the airline pilots to respect those picket lines and not
to go throukh them for any purpose; and to notify the National
Mediation Board in advance of such intent, thereby making it
21 In the Circuit Court, Dade County, Florida; the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division; and the Circuit Court,
Duval County, Florida.
22 New York Times, Feb. 5, 1948.
23 Air Line Pilot, Vol. 17, No. 3, April, 1948, pp. 1-4.
24 ALPA, Inter-Association Letter, Mar. 23, 1948, p. 3 (mimeographed).
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possible for the provisions of the Railway Labor Act to become
more effective.25
TABLE A - National Airlines, Inc., Operating Statistics
January-September, 1947 and 1948
A. Domestic Service
Revenue Passenger Revenue Passenger Daily Utilization
Miles (thousands) Load Factor(%) of Aircraft (Hrs.)
Month 1947 1948 1947 1948 1947 1948
January 14,315 10,356 67.5% 51.7% 8:48 5:53
February 15,108 1,907 68.3 51.8 9:46 1:04
March 17,758 3,931 70.3 50.8 9:56 1:44
April 16,637 5,098 67.8 40.3 9:36 2:10
May 14,696 7,759 54.8 35.6 9:07 3:18
June 11,452 8,076 45.5 35.7 8:29 3:50
July 10,027 7,574 42.9 31.1 6:09 3:56
August 11,597 7,884 47.1 31.0 6:03 4:03
September 12,165 7,701 51.2 34.2 6:10 3:54
B. International Service
Revenue Passenger Revenue Passenger Daily Utilization
Miles (thousands) Load Factor (%) of Airport (Hrs.)








































The NMB was duly informed, and on April 12, 1948, Mr. Behncke
also sent a letter directly to President Truman explaining the situation
that might develop in the absence of an Emergency Board appointment.
On May 15, apparently on- the recommendation of the NMB, the
President created an Emergency Board to investigate the ALPA-
National dispute.26 On June 3, after eight days of hearing had taken
place, an amendatory Executive Order instructed the Emergency
Board to consider the 1AM-National dispute as well. 27 Five additional
days of hearings were then held from June 1 through June 5. The
findings and recommendations of-the Emergency Board were reported
on July 9, 1948.
The Railway Labor Act provides (Sec. 10) that after the creation
of an Emergency Board, "and for thirty days after such Board has made
its report to the President, no change, except by agreement, shall be
made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions out of which
25 NAL Emergency Board, Transcript, p. 447.
26 Executive Order 9958. The members, named on May 19, were: Grady
Lewis (Chairman), Walter V. Schaefer and Curtis W. Roll.
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the dispute arose." Both unions used this clause as the basis for having
their respective members report back to work, but their offers to do
so were ignored by the Company. The Act, obviously, had not con-
templated a situation in which the Emergency Board is appointed long
after the commencement of a strike, and in which the strikers had been
completely replaced.
During the hearings, National held that the Emergency Board's
creation was improper because no emergency existed. It pointed out
that it had been serving every point on its system since May 15, and
that the NMB had previously asserted that no justification for the
creation of an Emergency Board existed. The Company also argued
that both strikes were illegally called: the ALPA walkout because the
dispute was still formally in mediation; the IAM walkout because the
thirty-day "status quo" period had not expired. It pointed out that
the employees who had been hired on a permanent basis to replace the
strikers also had an equity involved. And it pleaded:
The only inference which can be drawn from these facts is that
this Board was created for the purpose of intimidating the Carrier
into dismissing present employees, to create places for those who
have struck in wanton disregard of the law.
On this account, the jurisdiction of the Board has been challenged
from the outset, and we feel that this Board should report these
facts to the President, unless it wishes to encourage further emas-
culation of the Railway Labor Act.28
In its Report, the Board ignored the charge of illegality against the
ALPA strike. It found the IAM strike legal on the ground that the
30-day prohibition of changes "in the rates of pay, rules or working
conditions" following the failure of the NMB's mediatory activities
was a restriction only on the conduct of the employer, not the em-
ployees.
The Report of the Emergency Board contained a powerful indict-
ment of National's behavior and constituted a major tactical victory
for both unions. Concerning the pilots' dispute, the board found that
Over the entire period from the date of O'Neal's discharge ...
every one of the many efforts to dispose of the dispute was initiated
by the Association; in no instance did the Carrier take the initiative
and it was induced to act at all only when confronted with the
threat of a strike. What was sought by the Association was rea-
sonable. It did not seek reinstatement of O'Neal. It sought only
an impartial determination of the propriety of his discharge.29
Thereby fixing full blame for the strike upon the Company, the Board
observed:
The story revealed by the evidence is one of disregard for statu-
tory and contractual obligations on the part of the Carrier. It in-
dicates an immaturity and lack of responsibility which is not
28 NAL Emergency Board, Transcript, p. 1284.
29 Ibid., p. 7.
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consistent with the duties imposed by Congress upon carriers in
interstate commerce.30
Concerning the IAM dispute, the Board found that
By its unilateral actions concerning matters properly the subject
of' collective bargaining, National Airlines violated the duty im-
posed upon it by statute....
The Carrier's disregard of its statutory duty was not isolated or
accidental; on the contrary, it was repeated and deliberate. And
it contributed directly and immediately to the situation out of
which the strike arose.3 '
The Emergency Board recommended reinstatement of the ALPA and
IAM strikers; arbitration of the O'Neal case pursuant to the signed
agreement of May 14, 1947; and the resumption of negotiations for
a clerical agreement, to be concluded by arbitration if necessary.
National and the IAM, acting on the basis of the Emergency
Board's Report, resumed negotiations promptly and signed a detailed
settlement on July 27, 1948. This agreement provided for the return
of all strikers during the first half of August, for the initiation of
new collective bargaining conferences by August 27, and for the with-
drawal from or dismissal of all law suits 'and proceedings between
the parties. The ALPA immediately accepted the Report's recom-
mendations, which were exactly what the pilots' union had hoped for,
but on August 2, the Board's recommendations with respect to the
ALPA were rejected by the Company. A pilot settlement seemed
as distant as ever.
THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
The CAB became involved in the National controversy through
several avenues: because of its authority to determine air mail com-
pensation; because of the statutory requirement of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act that carriers comply with the Railway Labor Act as a
"condition upon the holding of" a route certificate; because of the
statutory requirement that all inter-carrier agreements be approved,
by the CAB; and because of the responsibility of the CAB for the
establishment of a sound route structure in scheduled air transportation.
On February 24, 1948, the CAB had awarded National a retro-
active and continuing mail rate increase, based on a Company request
which had failed to specify the strikes as a. major source of its financial
troubles. The ALPA protested this "Federal condonement of strike-
breaking," but in its final order on March 29, 1948, the CAB upheld
the mail rate increase with the assertion that National's needs "have
been measured independently of the strike.3 2 This was apparently
3 0 Ibid., p. 8.
31 Ibid., pp. 12-13, 15.
32 A year later, the CAB ruled that strike-caused losses would not, there-
after be offset by mail increases. CAB Opinion, accompanying Order No. E-2731,
April 19, 1949.,
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a euphemistic way of stating that the CAB had ignored the existence
of the strike. The new rate was estimated to mean an increase in
National's 1948 revenues of more than one million dollars.
On March 5, the IAM alleged in a formal complaint to the CAB
that National had failed to comply with the Railway Labor Act, asked
the CAB to order compliance, and "to revoke or suspend National's
certificate of authority to engage in air transportation" if the Com-
pany did not obey. On May 24, the CAB's enforcement attorneys
held that the CAB had no choice but to accept responsibility for the
determination of Railway Labor Act violations, in accordance with
its responsibilities under the Civil Aeronautics Act. The CAB did
-not take immediate action, and the IAM withdrew its complaint on
July 27 as a condition of the settlement with National.
On March 12 the CAB was asked to approve an agreement between
National and Capital Airlines for the interchange of aircraft and flight
personnel. National anticipated substantial increases in revenue and
a reduction in seasonal fluctuations in the use of personnel and equip-
ment from such interchange. On September 10, 1948, CAB Public
Counsel recorded his belief that it would be contrary to the public
interest for the CAB to approve the interchange if National was violat-
ing the Railway Labor Act. On November 8; 1948, CAB Examiner
E. T. Stodola recommended to the CAB that the commencement of
operations under the interchange agreement be contingent upon settle-
ment of the existing labor dispute between National and the ALPA.
The CAB's final Opinion in this case was not issued until April, 1949;
the text indicated that the CAB would have supported the Examiner's
position had not an ALPA-National settlement already been reached3 2a
On September 28, 1948, the CAB instituted an investigation to
determine whether the dismemberment of National, and the transfer
of its routes and equipment to other carriers on just terms and condi-
tions, would be in the public interest.3 2b The CAB "order" did not
refer in any way to the ALPA-National dispute. It was probably more
than a coincidence, however, that a long-range investigation of the
route structure of the United States should be launched at so critical
a time with proceedings specifically concerned with the dismember-
ment of National. The action did, in any event, serve to increase the
pressure on the Company for settling the ALPA controversy.
THE ALPA-NATONAL AGREEMENT
Early in October, 1948, overtures toward the ALPA for a resump-
tion of negotiations were advanced by National, and confidential talks
began about the middle of the month. Both sides had agreed to em-
82a CAB Opinion, E-2760, April 28, 1949.
32b CAB Order, E-2020. On March 16, 1951, CAB Opinion and Order E-5205,
it was held that "The public interest does not require a transfer of the whole or
any part of the route of National to any other carrier. . . ... The CAB noted:
"The record establishes that National has held its own since relieved of the
causes leading to its bad performance in 1948 ......
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ploy James M. Landis, former CAB Chairman, as a mediator. After
almost six weeks of intensive discussions, National and the ALPA
signed an agreement with the following major provisions: (1) Early
settlement of the O'Neal case by the addition of an impartial referee
to the System Board of Adjustment. The referee would be one of three
individuals nominated by the NMB, with the Company and the ALPA
each having the right to scratch one nominee. (2) The "expeditious"
return of all ALPA pilots to duty, with full seniority rights. Base pay
would begin, in any event, within sixty days. (3) Checkout of ALPA
pilots by check pilots borrowed from other airlines using comparable
equipment, so as to avoid discrimination. (4) Retention of Mr. Landis
as a concilator for nine months, and settlement by a neutral of all
otherwise unresolved grievances. (5) Amendment of the System Board
of Adjustment agreement in the ALPA contract to provide a manda-
tory deadlock-breaking procedure, utilizing the NMB, whenever the
System Board could not devise one of its own within thirty days.
(6) the withdrawal by both parties of all complaints or legal actions
or other proceedings brought against the other party.33 More than
three years after the O'Neal accident, an arbitrator was at last going
to determine the propriety of his discharge. The ALPA had gained
its point.
CONCLUSIONS
It is pertinent to inquire into the motivations that induced National
to seek a settlement, and to accept one on substantially the ALPA's
terms, three months after rejecting the similar recommendations of
the Emergency Board. The Company's dispute with the IAM had been
resolved by the July 27 agreement;3 4 its non-union pilots had func-
tioned with a spotless safety record; and its flight schedules had long
since been fully restored. With the ALPA strike thus "broken," the
Company had then taken the initiative to come to terms with the
apparently defeated party.
One element prompting National's change of heart in October
was clearly the failure of passenger traffic to return even to pre-strike
levels. Throughout the period of their walkout the union pilots had
waged an effective publicity campaign designed to keep the flying pub-
lic continually aware that National's regular pilots were on strike.
Sky-writing and sign-towing aircraft were utilized frequently over
major National stations, while uniformed pilots picketed on the
ground.3 5 With competing carriers available on most National routes,
air travelers were understandably prone to resolve any doubts as to
33 Memorandum of Agreement between National Airlines, Inc., and the Air
Line Pilots Association, International, Stipulating the Terms and Conditions to
End the National Strike (mimeographed), Nov. 24, 1948.
34 Soon after the IAM agreement National's advertising, stressing "Relia-
bility and Security," featured that fact that its maintenance was performed by
members of IAM, "a real American trade union." New York Times, Aug. 5, 1948.
35 The various publicity techniques are described in detail in the Air Line
Pilot, Vol. 17, Nos. 2-9, Feb.-Oct. 1948, passim.
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safety by avoiding National. The data in Table A show-that the slump
in passenger traffic was maintained to a significant degree even seven
months after the commencement of the ALPA strike. Passenger miles,
passenger load factors and average daily aircraft utilization all remained
well below the levels of the comparable months in 1947, whereas the
reverse was true for National's principal competitors.3 6
But another major consideration-perhaps the major consideration
-was National's belated recognition that a company as dependent upon
the Federal government as is an airline cannot continue to offend that
government and remain unscathed. When the CAB undertook to
accept responsibility for ascertaining violations of the Railway Labor
Act; when it threatened to withhold approval of National's interchange
agreement because of those violations; and when it launched an
inquiry into whether the public interest might not benefit from
National's liquidation as a corporate entity-the Company's manage-
ment soon became aware of the pressing need to effect a reconciliation
with the ALPA.
POSTSCRIPT
Publication of this paper was delayed by the author because imple-
mentation of the NAL-ALPA settlement proved to be a painful and
protracted matter and it was felt that its premature appearance might
adversely affect the relationships between the parties. There were
difficulties associated with the checking-out of the union pilots, who
had not flown for a long period, and obstacles placed in the path of
reinstatement by the non-union pilots who understandably resorted to
various dilatory tactics. It was not until 1950 that peace was fully
restored. Industrial relations at National are now reported to be
excellent.3a 1
To complete the chronicle of the incident which led to the ALPA
strike, it should also be recorded that on August 16, 1949, an arbitrator
named by the NMB finally disposed of the O'Neal case with an opinion
which concluded:
O'Neal's discharge on September 27, 1945, was in good faith, for
proper cause and in the interest of safety . . . [and] was not
arbitrary, malicious, discriminatory or capricious. 3 7
Captain O'Neal's discharge was upheld.
36 CAB, Recurrent Reports of Mileage and Traffic Data, 1948.
36a American Aviation, Vol. 15, No. 10, August 6, 1951, p. 41.
37 "Opinion of the Neutral Referee and Award," NAL Pilots System Board
of Adjustment (I. L. Broadwin, referee), Aug. 6, 1949 (mimeographed).
